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 “Opening the Door” to Presidential 
Press Conferences:  A Framework for 
the Right of Press Access 
Alexandria R. Taylor* 
Abstract 
Since President Donald Trump took office in 2017, there has 
been tension between the White House and the press. While this 
tension has been present in prior presidencies, its current 
manifestation raises important First Amendment issues. This 
Note discusses the limitations of the President to restrict the 
press’s right of First Amendment access to presidential press 
conferences. After delving into the Supreme Court’s development 
and recognition of the press’s right of access and how the lower 
courts have interpreted this right, this Note proposes a 
framework to analyze the press’s right of access and addresses 
the question of when and on what grounds the President can 
restrict this right. To illustrate these principles, this Note focuses 
on how three events involving President Trump and the press—
the Gaggle Exclusion, the Press Conference Exclusion, and the 
Press Pass Suspension—implicate the First Amendment and 
applies the suggested framework for analyzing the press’s right 
of access to these three events. 
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A free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the 
government and the people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter 
ourselves. 
Grosjean v. American Press Co. 
297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). 
I. Introduction 
This Note will address the limitations of the President to 
restrict the press’s right of First Amendment access to 
presidential press conferences. Part I will describe how three 
events involving President Donald Trump and the press 
implicate the First Amendment. Part II will track the Supreme 
Court’s development and recognition of the press’s right of 
access and will explore how lower courts have navigated this 
right. Part III will provide a framework to analyze the press’s 
right of access and will address the question of when and on 
what grounds the President can restrict this right. Part IV will 
present a framework for analyzing whether President Trump 
and his Administration have restrained the press’s right of 
access in violation of the First Amendment, applying it to the 
three aforementioned incidents. 
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A. Events Involving President Trump and the Press 
Since President Trump took office in 2017, there has been 
tension between the White House and the press—and it 
continues to escalate. While this tension has existed in prior 
presidencies, its current manifestation raises important First 
Amendment issues. Three events, described below, illustrate 
how President Trump and his Administration have restrained 
the press’s right of access and in doing so arguably violated the 
First Amendment. 
1. Incident #1:  The Gaggle Exclusion 
The first instance, occurring on February 24, 2017, involved 
journalists from several media outlets who were barred from 
attending a spontaneous press briefing with the Press Secretary 
at the White House.1 That day, reporters did not “expect the 
usual and more formal on-camera daily briefing from White 
House Press Secretary . . . but did expect a more spontaneous 
‘gaggle’ with the White House’s main spokesperson at some 
point” that afternoon.2 At noon, however, the White House 
updated the reporters, saying “that the gaggle would be 
off-camera with an ‘expanded pool.’”3 While some media 
outlets—including NBC News, CBS, ABC, FOX, the Washington 
Times and the Wall Street Journal—were allowed to attend the 
off-camera briefing, other news organizations—such as CNN, 
the New York Times, The Hill, BuzzFeed and Politico—were 
not.4 Some reporters, including those from The Associated Press 
 
 1. See Ali Vitali, White House Excludes Several Outlets from Press 
Gaggle, NBC NEWS (Feb. 24, 2017, 2:40 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com
/politics/white-house/white-house-excludes-several-outlets-press-gaggle-
n725366 (last visited Feb. 7, 2020) (noting that a spontaneous press briefing 
at the White House is called a “gaggle”) [https://perma.cc/ZW7E-8EZJ]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See id. (defining “pool” as a group of journalists who are chosen with 
the intention that “the material would be shared with all media colleagues 
regardless of who was physically present”). 
 4. See id. (noting that the Press Secretary characterized this exclusion 
by saying, “[W]e had a pool and then we expanded it. We added some folks to 
come cover it”). 
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and Time magazine, decided to boycott the briefing in light of 
the exclusion of the other reporters.5 Hours before the briefing, 
President Trump denounced the press, calling it “the enemy of 
the American people” during his speech to the annual 
Conservative Political Action Conference.6 Trump’s remarks 
and the White House’s actions were preceded by a CNN report 
the day before “that a White House official had asked the F.B.I. 
to rebut a New York Times article . . . detailing contacts 
between Mr. Trump’s associates and Russian intelligence 
officials.”7 
Much of the media, including a few media outlets that were 
in attendance at the February 24, 2017 briefing, and media 
advocacy groups spoke out against the exclusion of the reporters 
from the briefing and labeled the exclusion as “unprecedented”8 
and as “a notable break from protocol.”9 While the White House 
occasionally holds briefings with smaller groups of reporters, 
the difference in this case was that the White House was 
“cherry-pick[ing] which media outlets can participate in what 
would have otherwise been the press secretary’s televised daily 
 
 5. See id. (explaining that a few media outlets decided to not partake in 
the “expanded pool” after some media outlets of note were excluded). 
 6. See id. (noting that President Trump called the press “the enemy of 
the American People” because of his dismay toward the press using 
anonymous sources). 
 7. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Michael M. Grynbaum, Trump Intensifies 
His Attacks on Journalists and Condemns F.B.I ‘Leakers,’ N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/24/us/politics/white-house-sean-
spicer-briefing.html?module=inline (last visited Feb. 7, 2020) [https://
perma.cc/C5VY-5E45]. 
 8. See Dylan Byers et al., White House Blocks News Organizations from 
Press Briefing, CNN BUS. (Feb. 24, 2017, 7:23 PM), https://money.cnn.com
/2017/02/24/media/cnn-blocked-white-house-gaggle/index.html (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2019) (“The decision struck veteran White House journalists as 
unprecedented in the modern era . . . .”) [https://perma.cc/CTV7-33KY]. 
 9. See Hadas Gold, White House Selectively Blocks Media Outlets from 
Briefing with Spicer, POLITICO (Feb. 24, 2017, 2:31 PM), https://
www.politico.com/story/2017/02/reporters-blocked-white-house-gaggle-
235360 (last visited Feb. 7, 2020) (explaining that “the shift—a notable break 
in protocol” was the abrupt change from an on-camera gaggle to a restricted 
off-camera gaggle) [https://perma.cc/26HH-QQ8V]. 
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briefing.”10 The White House Correspondents’ Association 
(WHCA), which has represented the interests of members of the 
press who cover the White House since 1914, sent out a 
statement:  “The WHCA board is protesting strongly against 
how today’s gaggle is being handled by the White House. We 
encourage the organizations that were allowed in to share the 
material with others in the press corps who were not. The board 
will be discussing this further with White House staff.”11 
 
 10. See Sabrina Siddiqui, Trump Press Ban: BBC, CNN and Guardian 
Denied Access to Briefing, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 25, 2017, 12:49 PM), https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/24/media-blocked-white-house-
briefing-sean-spicer (last visited Feb. 7, 2020) (explaining that these 
particular briefings during the Trump Administration have become 
“indispensable . . . for journalists trying to interpret the [Administration’s] 
often contradictory statements . . . .”) [https://perma.cc/HFX3-SK6N]. A 
reporter from CNN, whom the White House excluded, explained the break in 
protocol: 
We lined up. We were told there was a list ahead of time, which is 
sort of abnormal, but we put our name on a list. And then when we 
went to enter, I was blocked by a White House staffer, who said we 
were not on the list for this gaggle today. Now, normally, if you were 
going to do something like this—an extended gaggle, off camera—
you would have one person from each news outlet . . . . [W]e have 
multiple people from CNN here every day. So, if you’re going to do 
something beyond a pool, which is sort of the smallest group of 
reporters that then disseminates the information, you would have 
one person from every news outlet. That is not what the White 
House was doing today. What the White House was doing was 
handpicking the outlets they wanted in for this briefing. 
So . . . news outlets that maybe the White House feels are more 
favorable were all allowed in, whereas I [and other reporters 
were] . . . blocked from entering. 
Callum Borchers, White House Blocks CNN, New York Times from Press 
Briefing Hours After Trump Slams Media, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2017, 4:10 
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/24/white-
house-blocks-cnn-new-york-times-from-press-briefing-hours-after-trump-
slams-media/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2020) (quoting CNN Political 
Correspondent Sara) [https://perma.cc/2NJQ-RWPS]. 
 11. White House Correspondents’ Ass’n Board, Statement (Feb. 24, 
2017), https://www.whca.press/2017/02/24/february-24-2017-statement/ (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2020) [https://perma.cc/48GM-CWD8]. 
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2. Incident #2:  The Press Conference Exclusion 
The second instance, occurring on July 25, 2018, involved 
the White House banning a “CNN reporter from attending a[n] 
[open] press event with President Donald Trump . . . after she 
asked him questions about his former lawyer Michael Cohen 
and Russian President Vladimir Putin” during an earlier photo 
op at the White House.12 While President Trump sat for 
pictures, the reporter asked questions about these individuals 
at a time that it was “typical . . . [to] attempt to ask the 
president questions.”13 After the CNN reporter asked her 
questions, members of the Trump Administration informed her 
that her questions were “inappropriate,” accusing her of 
shouting questions and refusing to leave despite repeatedly 
being asked to do so, and as a result, “she would not [later] be 
allowed to attend an open press event in the White House Rose 
Garden.”14 The president of FOX News, among other media 
outlets and reporters, issued a statement stating, “We stand in 
strong solidarity with CNN for the right to full access for our 
journalists as part of a free and unfettered press.”15 The WHCA 
also issued a statement: 
We strongly condemn the White House’s misguided and 
inappropriate decision today to bar one of our members from 
an open press event after she asked questions they did not 
like. This type of retaliation is wholly inappropriate, 
wrong-headed, and weak. It cannot stand. Reporters asking 
 
 12. Phil McLausand, White House Bans CNN Reporter from Rose Garden 
Event After She Peppers Trump with Tough Questions on Russia, Cohen, NBC 
NEWS (July 25, 2018, 8:13 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house
/white-house-bans-cnn-reporter-rose-garden-event-after-she-n894686 (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2020) [https://perma.cc/7X9A-RKZ9]. 
 13. See id. (explaining that this reporter was serving as the “pool 
reporter” during the Oval Office photo op, “meaning she was asking questions 
on behalf of several news organizations”). 
 14. See id. (explaining that the reporter was addressed immediately after 
the questions, and then later the Press Secretary issued a statement). 
 15. Matt Richardson, CNN Correspondent Blocked from White House 
Press Event, FOX NEWS (July 25, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/cnn-
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questions of powerful government officials, up to and 
including the President, helps hold those people accountable. 
In our republic, the WHCA supports the prerogative of all 
reporters to do their jobs without fear of reprisal from the 
government.16 
3. Incident #3:  The Press Pass Suspension 
The third instance, occurring on November 7, 2018, 
involved the White House suspending the press pass of CNN’s 
chief White House correspondent, Jim Acosta, after an incident 
at a White House press conference.17 As a result, CNN filed suit 
against President Trump and several of his aides.18 The suit 
asserted that the press pass revocation violated Acosta’s First 
and Fifth Amendment rights.19 During the White House press 
conference, Acosta had asked the President about immigration 
issues and about possible indictments involving Russia’s 
interference in the 2016 election.20 A White House intern 
reached across Acosta “to take the microphone from him.”21 
 
 16. Olivier Knox, President, White House Correspondents’ Ass’n, 
Statement from WHCA President Oliver Knox (July 25, 2018), https://
www.whca.press/2018/07/25/statement-from-whca-president-olivier-knox/ 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2020) [https://perma.cc/P37W-B4TX]. 
 17. See Brian Stelter, CNN Sues President Trump and Top White House 
Aids for Barring Jim Acosta, CNN BUS. (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.cnn.com
/2018/11/13/media/cnn-sues-trump/index.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2020) 
(noting that the CNN reporter Jim Acosta and CNN are “seeking a 
preliminary injunction . . . and a ruling from the court preventing the White 
House from revoking Acosta’s pass in the future”) [https://perma.cc/E4CY-
HXHK]. 
 18. See generally Complaint, Cable News Network, Inc. v. Trump, No. 
1:18-cv-02610 (D.C.C. Nov. 13, 2018) [hereinafter CNN v. Trump Complaint]. 
 19. See id. at 14–15 (alleging violations of First and Fifth Amendment 
rights). 
 20. See Merrit Kennedy & David Folkenflik, CNN Sues Trump 
Administration To Restore Jim Acosta’s Press Credentials, NPR (Nov. 13, 
2018, 3:58 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/11/13/667425530/cnn-sues-trump-
administration-over-jim-acostas-press-credentials (last visited Feb. 7, 2020) 
(noting specifically that “Acosta asked the president about his 
characterization of a migrant ‘caravan’ moving through Mexico as an ‘invasion’ 
and about possible indictments in the Russian investigation”) [https://
perma.cc/HD73-DVH3]. 
 21. Id. 
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Acosta responded, “‘Pardon me, ma’am,’ and did not release the 
microphone.”22 He then “asked a followup [sic] question, then 
gave up the mic.”23 During the exchange, President Trump 
called Acosta a “rude, terrible person” and said, “‘[w]hen you 
report fake news, which CNN does, a lot, you are the enemy of 
the people.’”24 After the incident, the White House initially 
characterized the interaction by saying Acosta had “plac[ed] his 
hands on a young woman trying to do her job as a White House 
intern.”25 The Press Secretary “tweeted a link to a video to back 
up her claim that Acosta physically fended off” the intern.26 This 
video was soon discredited by multiple media outlets, finding 
that the video had been altered to support the White House’s 
version.27 Later, the Press Secretary justified the revocation of 
Acosta’s press credentials, issuing a statement characterizing 
his actions as inappropriate and unprofessional: 
CNN, who has nearly 50 additional hard pass holders,28 and 
Mr. Acosta is no more or less special than any other media 
outlet or reporter with respect to the First Amendment. . . . 
The White House cannot run an orderly and fair press 
conference when a reporter acts this way, which is neither 
appropriate nor professional. The First Amendment is not 
served when a single reporter, of more than 150 present, 
attempts to monopolize the floor. If there is no check on this 
type of behavior it impedes the ability of the President, the 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Stelter, supra note 17. 
 24. CNN v. Trump Complaint, supra note 18, at 10. 
 25. See Kennedy & Folkenflik, supra note 20 (“Initially, when the White 
House said it was suspending Acosta’s credential, it said it would ‘never 
tolerate a reporter placing his hands on a young woman just trying to do her 
job as a White House intern.’”). 
 26. Id.  
 27. See id. (noting that White House counselor Kellyanne Conway later 
“denied that the video had been altered but then said it had been ‘sped up’ and 
that ‘they do it all the time in sports to see if there’s actually a first down or a 
touchdown’”). 
 28. See, e.g., CNN v. Trump Complaint, supra note 18, at 2 (explaining a 
“hard pass” allows a reporter “regular and unescorted access to the White 
House and White House briefings”). 
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White House staff, and members of the media to conduct 
business.29 
After the incident, the President said that Acosta “was not 
nice to the young woman,” but “I don’t hold him for that because 
it wasn’t overly, you know, horrible.”30 The President also told 
other reporters, “You have to treat the White House with 
respect. You have to treat the presidency with respect.”31 In the 
same breath, he suggested that there “could be others” who 
might lose their credentials.32  
In his complaint, Acosta claimed that the Trump 
Administration’s “decision to revoke Acosta’s press credentials 
violates the First Amendment” because “Acosta’s questions to 
President Trump during that conference are and were all 
protected activities under the First Amendment,” and the 
Administration deprived him of the “right to access the White 
House grounds by revoking [his] White House credentials.”33 
The complaint characterized the Trump Administration’s 
changing justifications for denying Acosta press credentials as 
“hollow” and insufficient to justify “impeding [Acosta’s] First 
Amendment rights.”34 The complaint further contended that 
revocation of Acosta’s press access right was “a form of 
content- and viewpoint-based discrimination and in retaliation 
for Plaintiffs’ exercise of protected First Amendment activity” 
 
 29. Brian Stelter, Sarah Sanders Responds to the CNN Suit, CNN BUS. 
(Nov. 13, 2018, 11:27 AM), https://www.cnn.com/business/live-news/cnn-sues-
trump-acosta-reaction/h_60ac92e98a6edf377df982c9ecd131ad (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2020) [https://perma.cc/T447-MAVH]. 
 30. Stelter, supra note 17. 
 31. See David Bauder & Jonathan Lemire, Trump Claims Video 
Distributed by White House Wasn’t Altered, AP NEWS (Nov. 9, 2018), https://
www.apnews.com/8c4b1b634fe64ebba75bbf98edf9db4f (last visited Feb. 7, 
2020) (noting that during this same exchange, Trump said that Acosta is a 
“very unprofessional guy. I don’t think he’s a smart person but he has a loud 
voice”) [https://perma.cc/CM5N-Z8AN?type=image]. 
 32. See id. (noting that President Trump had not decided if Acosta’s pass 
would be reinstated). 
 33. CNN v. Trump Complaint, supra note 18, at 14. 
 34. Id. at 15. 
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motivated by a dislike of CNN’s and Acosta’s “coverage of the 
administration and critique of the President.”35 
In reaction to the revocation of the reporter’s press pass, the 
WHCA released a statement in support of CNN: 
[WHCA] strongly supports CNN’s goal of seeing their 
correspondent regain a U.S. Secret Service security 
credential that the White House should not have taken away 
in the first place. Revoking access to the White House 
complex amounted to disproportionate reaction to the events 
of last Wednesday. We continue to urge the Administration 
to reverse course and fully reinstate CNN’s correspondent. 
The President of the United States should not be in the 
business of arbitrarily picking the men and women who cover 
him.36 
The presiding federal district court judge ultimately 
granted CNN’s and Acosta’s request for a temporary restraining 
order and ordered the Administration to restore Acosta’s 
credentials.37 The judge did so on the ground that the 
Administration violated Acosta’s Fifth Amendment right by 
depriving him of “a fair and transparent process.”38 The judge 
did not make any determinations based on the First 
Amendment claim.39 CNN dropped its lawsuit after the White 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Olivier Knox, President, White House Correspondents’ Ass’n, 
Statement by WHCA President Olivier Knox on CNN Lawsuit Against White 
House (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.whca.press/2018/11/13/statement-by-
whca-president-olivier-knox-on-cnn-lawsuit-against-white-house/ (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2020) [https://perma.cc/5TE5-YP8J]. 
 37. See Michael M. Grynbaum & Emily Baumgaertner, CNN’s Jim 
Acosta Returns to the White House After Judge’s Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/16/business/media/cnn-acosta-
trump.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2020) (noting that the judge “hand[ed] the 
cable network [CNN] an early win in its lawsuit against the president and 
members of his administration”) [https://perma.cc/DJT3-HSET]. 
 38. See id. (noting that the judge stated from the bench that “the 
administration’s process for barring the correspondent ‘is still so shrouded in 
mystery that the government could not tell me’ who made the decision”). 
 39. See id. (noting that the judge said, “I want to emphasize the very 
limited nature of this ruling . . . . I have not determined that the First 
Amendment was violated here”). 
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House fully restored Acosta’s press pass.40 In the same breath, 
the White House issued a set of rules that “reporters may only 
ask ‘a single question’ at a press conference, and “[f]ollow-up 
questions will only be permitted ‘at the discretion of the 
President or other White House officials.’”41 Further, “reporters 
must ‘physically surrender’ the microphone, when directed.”42 
In response, the WHCA issued a statement noting its 
disapproval of the White House’s new rules: 
The White House Correspondents’ Association had no role in 
crafting any procedures for future press conferences. For as 
long as there have been White House press conferences, 
White House reporters have asked follow-up questions. We 
fully expect this tradition will continue. We will continue to 
make the case that a free and independent news media plays 
a vital role in the health of our republic.43 
As noted, the judge hearing CNN’s and Acosta’s First 
Amendment challenge did not reach that issue and provide a 
legal analysis of the right asserted. This Note will do so. 
 
 40. See Brian Stelter & David Shortell, White House Backs Down from 
Legal Fight, Restores Jim Acosta’s Press Pass, CNN BUS. (Nov. 19, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/19/media/cnn-acosta-emergency-hearing
/index.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2020) (issuing a statement in which CNN said, 
“Today the White House fully restored Jim Acosta’s press pass. As a result, 
our lawsuit is no longer necessary . . . . We look forward to continuing to cover 
the White House”) [https://perma.cc/3HJU-ZAEU]. 
 41. See id. (“[W]e have made a final determination in this process:  [Y]our 
hard pass is restored. Should you refuse to follow these rules in the future, we 
will take action in accordance with the rules set forth above.”). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Olivier Knox, President, White House Correspondents’ Ass’n,  WHCA 
Statement on Restoration of Press Pass (Nov. 19, 2018), https://
www.whca.press/2018/11/19/whca-statement-on-restoration-of-press-pass/ 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2020) [https://perma.cc/C247-F6DG]. 
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II. Locating the Press’s Right of Access in the First Amendment 
A. Supreme Court Decisions 
The First Amendment, among other things, guarantees the 
rights to freedom of speech and press.44 The Supreme Court has 
held that the government has a heavy burden to justify a direct 
or indirect burden on First Amendment rights:  it must 
“convincingly show a substantial relation between the 
information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling 
state interest.”45 
The Supreme Court began to develop a right of First 
Amendment access in the 1930s when it found that a labor 
union could not be denied the right of access to a public building 
based on an ordinance that would allow the arbitrary 
suppression of speech and association.46 Prior to 1974, the issue 
of access to public property was addressed in a number of 
Supreme Court cases not involving the press.47  
 
 44. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”). 
 45. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 
(1963); accord, Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53–54 (1982) (“[T]he First 
Amendment surely requires that the restriction be demonstrably supported by 
not only a legitimate state interest, but a compelling one, and that the 
restriction operate without unnecessarily circumscribing protected 
expression.”); see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (“The 
decisions of this Court have consistently held that only a compelling state 
interest in the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power 
to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms.”); Bates v. City of 
Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) (“Where there is a significant 
encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing 
a subordinating interest which is compelling.”). 
 46. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939) (“[The 
ordinance] enables the Director of Safety to refuse a permit on his mere 
opinion that such refusal will prevent ‘riots, disturbances or disorderly 
assemblage.’ It can thus be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of 
free expression of views . . . .”). The Supreme Court had set the groundwork 
for Hague the year before when it first held that the government could not 
impose arbitrary restrictions on the right to circulate religious literature on 
public streets in Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).  
 47. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 828 (1976) (stating that 
antiwar demonstrators had no First Amendment right of access to a military 
base for political activity); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 169–70 (1972) 
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In Pell v. Procunier,48 the Supreme Court first addressed 
the press’s right of access to public property.49 In that case the 
Court found that a prison policy did not violate journalists’ First 
Amendment rights when it disallowed the journalists to have 
face-to-face interviews with inmates.50 The Court noted that 
while “[t]he First and Fourteenth Amendments bar government 
from interfering in any way with a free press, . . . [t]he 
Constitution does not . . . require government to accord the 
press special access to information not shared by members of 
the public generally,” nor does it have an affirmative duty to do 
so.51 Nevertheless, the Court reaffirmed the importance of a free 
press and its significance in creating a connector between the 
general public and its government: 
The constitutional guarantee of a free press assures the 
maintenance of our political system and an open society, and 
 
(explaining that an antiwar organization could not be denied access to campus 
facilities because of unpopular views); Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 
92, 92 (1972) (discussing a public body could not ban political picketing but 
allow labor picketing near schools); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617 
(1968) (stating civil marchers could be banned from courthouse property, 
where their presence interfered with the rights of others to access the 
building); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966) (explaining that civil 
rights demonstrations could be banned from county jail, a public area not 
traditionally opened to public access); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 143 
(1966) (asserting that civil rights demonstrators could not be banned from 
public library based on racial discrimination); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 
544–45 (1965) (explaining that civil rights marchers could not be banned from 
courthouse grounds under statute that gave unfettered discretion to police); 
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (asserting that black 
demonstrators could not be banned from state house grounds for expressing 
unpopular views). 
 48. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827–28 (1974) (holding that the 
press may be denied prisoner visitation in a manner consistent with a bar to 
public access generally). 
 49. See id. at 830–31 (introducing an analysis of the First Amendment 
claims of plaintiffs under an access to government property framework). 
 50. See id. at 819 (“The plaintiffs brought the suit to challenge the 
constitutionality, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, . . . of the 
California Department of Corrections Manual, which provides that ‘press and 
other media interviews with specific individual inmates will not be 
permitted.’”). 
 51. Id. at 834. 
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secures the paramount public interest in a free flow of 
information to the people concerning public officials . . . . 
Correlatively, the First and Fourteenth Amendments also 
protect the right of the public to receive such information and 
ideas as are published.52 
On the same day as the Pell ruling, the Court similarly held 
in Saxbe v. Washington Post53 that a prison policy prohibiting 
face-to-face interviews with individual inmates did not violate 
the reporter’s First Amendment rights.54 The policy was merely 
“a variation of the burden on all individuals, press or not, to 
allow no one to enter the prison and to speak with whomever he 
or she would like.”55 In Justice Powell’s dissent, he expressed 
concern about the idea “that no governmental inhibition of press 
access to newsworthy information warrants constitutional 
scrutiny,”56 stating:  
It goes too far to suggest that the government must justify 
under the stringent standards of First Amendment review 
every regulation that might affect in some tangential way 
the availability of information to the news media . . . . [But] 
[a]t some point official restraints on access to news 
sources . . . may so undermine the function of the First 
Amendment that it is both appropriate and necessary to 
require the government to justify such regulations in terms 
more compelling than discretionary authority and 
administrative convenience.57 
 
 52. Id. at 832. 
 53. See Saxbe v. Wash. Post, 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (holding a District 
of Columbia policy banning face-to-face interviews did not violate the First 
Amendment’s freedom of the press provision). The Court noted that Saxbe was 
“constitutionally indistinguishable” from Pell. Id. 
 54. See id. at 850 (“[S]ince Policy Statement 1220.1A ‘does not deny the 
press access to sources of information available to members of the general 
public,’ we hold that it does not abridge the freedom that the First Amendment 
guarantees.” (quoting Pell, 417 U.S. at 835)). 
 55. Ilana Friedman, Note, Where Public and Private Spaces Converge: 
Discriminatory Media Access to Government Information, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
253, 264 (2006) (citing Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 849). 
 56. Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 860 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 57. Id. 
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Based on similar facts in Pell and Saxbe, the Supreme Court 
in Houchins v. KQED, Inc.58 held that “[t]he news media have 
no constitutional right of access to a county jail, over and above 
that of other persons, to interview inmates . . . for publication 
and broadcasting.”59 Still, within limitations, the Court 
recognized the importance of the media’s role to inform the 
public: 
Beyond question, the role of the media is important; acting 
as the “eyes and ears” of the public, they can be a powerful 
and constructive force, contributing to remedial action in the 
conduct of public business. They have served that function 
since the beginning of the Republic, but like all other 
components of our society media representatives are subject 
to limits.60 
The Houchins Court also recognized “the role of the media 
‘as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental 
officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping 
officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom 
they were selected to serve.’”61 
Two years later, the Supreme Court held that the press had 
a right of access to criminal trials under the First Amendment 
in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.62 The Court located 
“[t]he right of access to places traditionally open to the public” 
in “the amalgam of the First Amendment guarantees of speech 
and press,” in addition to the right of assembly.63 The Supreme 
Court considered the policy implications if it were to not 
recognize the right of access in the case of a criminal trial, 
 
 58. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 2 (1978) (holding the media 
has no special right of access to penal institutions). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 8. 
 61. Id. at 10 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966)). 
 62. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577 (1980) 
(plurality opinion) (holding the First Amendment guarantees a right of public 
access to criminal trials). 
 63. See id. at 577–78 (“A trial courtroom also is a public place where the 
people generally—and representatives of the media have a right to be present, 
and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance the 
integrity and quality of what takes place.”). 
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stating that “[t]he explicit, guaranteed rights to speak and to 
publish concerning what takes place at a trial would lose much 
meaning if access to observe the trial could, as it was here, be 
foreclosed arbitrarily.”64 The Court added that “[f]ree speech 
carries with it some freedom to listen.”65 Further, the Court 
viewed the media as a conduit between the public and criminal 
proceedings.66 Because the press often holds special privileges, 
such as “special seating and priority of entry,” the press was in 
the best position to deliver information about a proceeding to 
the greater public who is unable to observe a trial firsthand.67 
In turn, this symbiotic relationship “contribute[s] to public 
understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of the 
functioning of the entire criminal justice system.”68 Thus, the 
Court held that “the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in 
the guarantees of the First Amendment,” because “[w]ithout the 
freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised for 
centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and ‘of the 
press could be eviscerated.’”69 
Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion predicated a 
right of press access to attend criminal trials under two 
conditions:  1) whether there is an “enduring and vital tradition” 
of public access to the forum, and 2) “whether access to a 
particular government process is important in terms of that 
very process.”70 
 
 64. Id. at 576–77. 
 65. Id. at 576. 
 66. See id. at 572–73 (noting that the media functions “as surrogates for 
the public”). 
 67. See id. at 573 (“While media representatives enjoy the same right of 
access as the public, they often are provided special seating and priority of 
entry so that they may report what people in attendance have seen and 
heard.”).  
 68. Id. (quoting Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) 
(Brennan, J., concurring)). 
 69. Id. at 580 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)). 
 70. Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,71 the Supreme 
Court extended the access rule and held a Massachusetts state 
law which required judges at trials for sexual offenses against 
minors to exclude the press and general public from the 
courtroom during the victim’s testimony unconstitutional under 
the First Amendment.72 The Court applied the Richmond 
Newspapers test—referring to each prong, respectively, as 
“experience” and “logic”73—to explain why a right of access 
under the First Amendment applies to criminal trials:74 
First, the criminal trial historically has been open to the 
press and general public . . . . This uniform rule of openness 
has been viewed as significant in constitutional terms not 
only because the Constitution carries the gloss of history, but 
also because a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable 
judgment of experience . . . . Second, the right of access to 
criminal trials plays a particularly significant role in the 
functioning of the judicial process and the government as a 
whole. Public scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the 
quality and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding 
process, with benefits to both the defendant and to society as 
a whole. Moreover, public access to the criminal trial fosters 
an appearance of fairness, thereby heightening public 
respect for the judicial process. And in the broadest terms, 
public access to criminal trials permits the public to 
participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial 
process—an essential component in our structure of 
self-government.75 
 
 71. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982) 
(holding a mandatory-closure rule for state courts violates the First 
Amendment). 
 72. See id. at 602 (“[T]he mandatory-closure rule contained in § 16A [of 
Chapter 278 of the Massachusetts General Laws] violates the First 
Amendment.”). 
 73. See id. at 606 (“[T]he institutional value of the open criminal trial is 
recognized in both logic and experience.”). 
 74. See id. at 605 (“Two features of the criminal justice system, 
emphasized in the various opinions in Richmond Newspapers, together serve 
to explain why a right of access to criminal trials in particular is properly 
afforded protection by the First Amendment.”) 
 75. Id. at 605–06. 
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The Court recognized that the government can only 
overcome the right of access to criminal trials if it can show “that 
the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental 
interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”76 
Although the Court acknowledged the government’s interests 
were compelling—to protect sexual abuse victims and to 
encourage them to come forward with their claims—the means 
by which the state achieved these interests—imposing a 
mandatory closure rule—were not narrowly tailored.77 The 
Court stated that “circumstances under which the press and 
public can be barred from a criminal trial are limited,”78 
reiterating the criminal trial’s presumption of openness as 
recognized in Richmond Newspapers.79 
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise 
I),80 the Supreme Court applied both the two-pronged test from 
Richmond Newspapers and the compelling interest standard 
from Globe Newspaper to determine whether the right of access 
in criminal trials could extend to voir dire examination of 
potential jurors.81 First, under the Richmond Newspapers test, 
the Court concluded that that there is a right of access to the 
jury selection process because jury selection has historically 
been an open process and, as such, “gives assurance that 
established procedures are being followed and that deviations 
 
 76. Id. at 607.  
 77. See id. at 607–10 (“But as compelling as that interest is, it does not 
justify a mandatory closure rule, for it is clear that the circumstances of the 
particular case may affect the significance of the interest.”). 
 78. Id. at 606. 
 79. See id. at 605, 610, 619 (referring to Richmond Newspapers’ 
acknowledgement that criminal trials have historically been presumptively 
open). 
 80. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 
505 (1984) (holding the selection of jurors to be a public process under First 
Amendment access principles). 
 81. See Amy Jordan, The Right of Access:  Is There a Better Fit than the 
First Amendment?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1349, 1355 (2004) (“In Press-Enterprise I, 
the Court for the first time used the dual considerations of Richmond 
Newspapers and Globe to assess the press’s right of access to proceedings other 
than criminal trials.” (citing Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 503)). 
 
  
 “OPENING THE DOOR” TO PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCES 855 
 
will become known.”82 Second, under the Globe Newspaper test, 
the Court concluded that, although the “jury selection process 
may, in some circumstances, give rise to a compelling interest of 
a prospective juror when interrogation touches on deeply 
personal matters that person has legitimate reasons for keeping 
out of the public domain,” the trial judge’s “broad order denying 
access to information at the voir dire” was not narrowly tailored, 
because he could have limited the information to what “was 
actually sensitive and deserving of privacy protection.”83 
Two years later, the Supreme Court continued to distill 
Justice Brennan’s two principles from Richmond Newspapers in 
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II),84 
referring to them as the “tests of experience and logic” to 
determine “whether a qualified First Amendment right of public 
access attaches” to preliminary hearings.85 The “experience” test 
required considering “whether the place and process have 
historically been open to the press and general public.”86 The 
“logic” test required considering “whether public access plays a 
significant positive role in the functioning of the particular 
process in question.”87 Based on these tests, the Court held that 
a constitutional right of access applied to preliminary 
hearings.88 The “logic and experience” test “has become the 
 
 82. See Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 508 (“Openness thus enhances 
both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so 
essential to public confidence in the system.” (citing Richmond Newspapers, 
448 U.S. at 569–71)). 
 83. Id. at 511–13. 
 84. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 
1, 10 (1986) (holding the First Amendment right of access of criminal trials 
applies to preliminary hearings).  
 85. See id. at 10 (concluding that a qualified First Amendment right of 
access to criminal proceedings attaches to California preliminary hearings); 
see also Jordan, supra note 81, at 1357 (explaining that the right is qualified 
because “it can be overcome if the government can withstand the strict 
scrutiny standard of Globe”). 
 86. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8 (distilling the “experience” 
prong from the consideration that a “tradition of accessibility implies the 
favorable judgment of experiences”). 
 87. See id. 
 88. See id. at 10 (“The considerations that led the Court to apply the First 
Amendment right of access to criminal trials in Richmond 
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framework for determining whether the public has a right of 
access to other aspects of judicial proceedings,” but courts have 
expanded its application, revealing “a general agreement among 
the courts that the public’s right of access attaches to decisions 
‘of major importance to the administration of justice.’”89 
A default rule to be derived from the Supreme Court access 
cases is that once the government has “opened its door” to public 
access, the Constitution assures the public and the press 
access.90 Moreover, under the logic of the access cases, once 
government “opens the door” allowing press access, members of 
the press cannot be arbitrarily excluded based on viewpoint 
considerations.91 
B. Lower Court Decisions 
To date, the U.S. Supreme Court has not decided the extent 
to which governmental bodies under the First Amendment can 
exclude members of the press from press conferences. In 1972, 
in deciding Lewis v. Baxley,92 an Alabama district court held 
that “there is a limited First Amendment right of access 
to . . . the press rooms, and the press conferences dealing with 
 
Newspapers and Globe Newspaper and the selection of jurors in Press-
Enterprise I lead us to conclude that the right of access applies to preliminary 
hearings as conducted in California.”). 
 89. See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 10–11 (1st Cir. 1986) 
(noting courts’ recognitions of a public right of access to voir dire in a criminal 
trial, criminal pretrial hearings, and civil cases, for instance) (quoting In re 
Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1984)).  
 90. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1977) (Steward, J., 
concurring) (“The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not guarantee the 
public a right of access to information generated or controlled by 
government . . . . The Constitution does no more than assure the public and 
the press equal access once government has opened its doors.”). 
 91. See Developments in the Law—The Law of Media, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
990, 1019–20 (2007) (“[J]ournalists cannot be arbitrarily excluded from press 
forums to which other journalists have access in retaliation for previously 
expressed viewpoints.”). 
 92. See Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768, 777 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (holding 
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state government.”93 The court held that this right is “limited” 
to “access to places that other members of the press may go and 
congregate in the ordinary course of events,” but that all 
reporters do not have a constitutional right to an individual 
interview just because another reporter was granted that 
access.94 The court emphasized that “[t]he right of access is a 
limited right to reasonable access.”95  
Several years later, a Hawaii district court applied the 
Lewis v. Baxley holding to another instance of press access.96 
The Hawaiian court concluded that a mayor could not deny a 
reporter access to a general news conference held in the mayor’s 
office because “other news reporters attend[ed] press 
conferences” in the mayor’s office.97 The district court explained: 
If he chooses to hold a general news conference in his inner 
office, for that purpose and to that extent his inner office 
becomes a public gathering place. When he uses public 
buildings and public employees to call and hold general news 
conferences on public matters he is operating in the public 
and not the private sector of his activities.98 
The mayor had “opened the door” to the reporters’ right of 
access to his office after he had made his office available to 
members of the press generally.99 Thus, the mayor could not 
prevent the plaintiff, an individual reporter, from attending the 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Borreca v. Fasi, 369 F. Supp. 906, 908–09 (D. Haw. 1974) (“The 
First Amendment freedom of the press includes a limited right of reasonable 
access to news . . . . This right of access includes a right of access to the public 
galleries, the press rooms, and the press conferences dealing with 
government.” (citing Lewis, 368 F. Supp. at 777)). 
 97. Id. at 911. 
 98. Id. at 910. 
 99. See id. at 907 (defining a general news conference as a conference 
“where all media generally are informed of the mayor’s intention to hold a 
news conference and all are free to attend”). 
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general press conference.100 The court also recognized that, 
while government officials have the First Amendment right to 
criticize the press, there is a line: 
[W]hen criticism transforms into an attempt to use the 
powers of governmental office to intimidate or to discipline 
the press or one of its members because of what appears in 
print, a compelling governmental interest that cannot be 
served by less restrictive means must be shown for such use 
to meet Constitutional standards. No compelling 
governmental interest has been shown or even claimed 
here.101 
In 1976, a Massachusetts district court granted a 
temporary restraining order against city public officials when 
they excluded a news station’s cameramen from accessing the 
city council chamber and a press area designated for 
cameramen, and then only allowed them access to the 
spectator’s section, in violation of their First Amendment 
rights.102 The court highlighted the distinction between a news 
conference and a private interview: 
Public officials need not furnish information, other than 
public records, to any news agency. The opportunities to 
cover official news sources must be the same for all 
accredited news gatherers, however. All representatives of 
news organizations must not only be given equal access, but 
within reasonable limits, access with equal convenience to 
official news sources.103 
Although not absolute, this right “may not be 
infringed . . . in the absence of a compelling government interest 
 
 100. See id. 907–08 (noting that the mayor denied the plaintiff, an 
individual reporter, and his publication multiple times from attending press 
conferences while other reporters were allowed). 
 101. Id. at 910.  
 102. See Westinghouse Broad. Co. v. Dukakis, 409 F. Supp. 895, 896–97 
(D. Mass. 1976) (deciding in favor of the news station because a city 
councilman had asked two cameramen to leave the council chamber while 
allowing the same station’s reporter to remain). 
 103. Id. at 896. 
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to the contrary.”104 The court found that the station was 
“entitled to share the special facilities provided for other 
stations, even though they are provided as a convenience.”105 
The court also found that the city public officials had shown no 
compelling government interest to overcome an interference 
with the station’s rights under the First Amendment.106 
In American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Cuomo,107 the 
Second Circuit articulated that, “once there is a public function, 
public comment, and participation by some of the media, the 
First Amendment requires equal access to all of the media or 
the rights of the First Amendment would no longer be 
tenable.”108 In that case, the Second Circuit held that “the First 
Amendment rights of [the television network] ABC and of its 
viewing public would be impaired by their exclusion from the 
[mayoral] campaign activities” after the candidates denied ABC 
access to broadcast live coverage of postelection activities at the 
candidates’ headquarters.109 In support of its decision, the 
Second Circuit explained that the candidates had opened the 
door to the press having access to their campaign activities: 
We think that once the press is invited, including the media 
operating by means of instantaneous picture broadcast, 
there is a dedication of those premises to public 
communications use. . . . The issue is not whether the public 
is or is not generally excluded, but whether the members of 
the broadcast media are generally excluded. If choice were 
 
 104. Id. (citing Quad-City Cmty. News Serv., Inc. v. Jebens, 334 F. Supp. 
8 (S.D. Iowa 1971); Borreca v. Fasi, 369 F. Supp. 906 (D. Haw. 1974)). 
 105. Id. at 897. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Cuomo, 570 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(holding that when there is a public function, public comment, or participation 
by some media there is a First Amendment requires equal access by all of the 
media).  
 108. Id. at 1083; see also, e.g., Nation Magazine v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 762 
F. Supp. 1558, 1573 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“Regardless of whether the government 
is constitutionally required to open the battlefield to the press as 
representatives of the public, a question that this Court has declined to decide, 
once the government does so it is bound to do so in a non-discriminatory 
manner.”). 
 109. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 570 F.2d at 1083. 
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allowed for discrimination in a public event of this 
magnitude in the various media, then we reject the 
contention that it is within the prerogative of a political 
candidate. We rather think that the danger would be that 
those of the media who are in opposition or who the 
candidate thinks are not treating him fairly would be 
excluded. And thus we think it is the public which would 
lose.110 
Each of these press access opinions, while illuminating in 
some respects, are “vague regarding the degree of inclusiveness 
needed to trigger a right of equal access.”111 
In 1977, the D.C. Circuit in Sherrill v. Knight112 provided 
more precise guidance regarding press access in the very context 
of White House press conferences.113 The D.C. Circuit concluded 
that because “the White House has voluntarily decided to 
establish press facilities for correspondents who need to report 
therefrom,” it has triggered the proviso that the government 
“open[ed] its door” to “all bona fide Washington-based 
journalists,” and thus could not arbitrarily exclude journalists 
from White House press facilities.114 In Sherrill, the Secret 
Service denied the Washington correspondent for The Nation a 
press pass to White House press facilities.115 The White House 
and Secret Service argued in support of their access denial:  
 
 110. Id. (emphasis added). 
 111. See Luke M. Milligan, Rethinking Press Rights of Equal Access, 65 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1103, 1107 n. 10 (2008) (noting that these decisions were 
based “on the factual context of the exclusion of the reporter:  [G]eneral news 
conferences open to all media” (quoting Snyder v. Ringgold, 40 F. Supp. 2d 
714, 717 (D. Md. 1999))). 
 112. See Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding 
that denial of press access to the White House briefing room must be based on 
a compelling governmental interest and is subject to other procedural 
requirements). 
 113. See id. at 126 (detailing facts of the case including the denial of a 
White House press pass to a reporter). 
 114. Id. at 129. 
 115. See id. at 126 (“The denial resulted solely from the determination of 
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Because the public has no right of access to the White House, 
and because the right of access due the press generally is no 
greater than that due the general public, denial of a White 
House press pass is violative of the [F]irst [A]mendment only 
if it is based upon the content of the journalist’s speech or 
otherwise discriminates against a class of protected 
speech.116 
The D.C. Circuit rejected the defendants’ argument, noting 
that, regardless of an individual reporter’s more restricted 
access into the “greater” White House itself, White House press 
facilities specifically “hav[e] been made publicly available as a 
source of information” for journalists and “are perceived as 
being open to all bona fide Washington-based 
journalists . . . .”117 Because the White House has “voluntarily 
decided to establish press facilities for correspondents who need 
to report therefrom,” it was of no moment that press facilities 
merely ensured a right to access of the press and not the 
“general public.”118 Thus, the White House “opened the door” to 
equal press access to certain of its facilities by opening the 
facilities to the press in general.119 The Sherrill court 
demarcated this general rule by noting that the President 
retained the discretion to grant exclusive interviews or briefings 
with selected journalists without the risk of opening the door to 
having to grant exclusive interviews to all journalists.120  
In finding that “[t]he protection afforded newsgathering 
under the [F]irst [A]mendment guarantee of freedom of the 
press . . . requires that this access not be denied arbitrarily or 
 
 116. Id. at 129. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. 
 119. Id.; see also Milligan, supra note 111, at 1107 (balancing barring “bad” 
forms of selective access (press conferences) and “good” forms of selective 
access (exclusive interviews) by producing a test that says “[a]n excluded 
reporter enjoys a presumptive right of access whenever such access is already 
generally inclusive of the press”). 
 120. See Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 129 (“Nor is the discretion of the President 
to grant interviews or briefings with selected journalists challenged. It would 
certainly be unreasonable to suggest that because the President allows 
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for less than compelling reasons,”121 the D.C. Circuit in its 
decision took into account not only the interests of members of 
the press and the publications for which they write but also the 
interests of the “public at large.”122 If the government arbitrarily 
restricts a journalist from “newsgathering” and “sources of 
information,” the corollary to the journalist’s restriction is that 
the government will also be restricting the “public at large” from 
accessing a variety of “sources of information.”123 Further, while 
the Sherrill court acknowledged the unique security concerns at 
the White House, it found that merely informing the reporter 
the Secret Service’s basis for the exclusion of the journalist—
“reasons of security”—without more, was insufficient.124 The 
D.C. Circuit acknowledged that a showing of “potential risk to 
the physical security of the President or his family,” in 
conjunction with a “publish[ed] or otherwise ma[de] publicly 
known . . .[,] explicit and meaningful standard governing denial 
of White House press passes,” may constitute a compelling 
interest to permit denial of press access to particular 
reporters.125 
 
 121. Id. (citing Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 829–35 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 
681 (1972); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)). 
 122. See id. at 129–30 (“Not only newsmen and the publications for which 
they write, but also the public at large have an interest protected by the first 
amendment in assuring that restrictions on newsgathering be no 
more arduous than necessary, and that individual newsmen not be arbitrarily 
excluded from sources of information.” (citing Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 
U.S. 469, 491–92 (1975); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 
362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943))).  
 123. See id. (“[R]ight conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a 
multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection” 
(quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 
1943))). 
 124. See id. at 130 (“Merely informing . . . rejected applicants that 
rejection was for ‘reasons of security’ does not inform the public or other 
potential applicants of the basis for exclusion of journalists from White House 
press facilities. Moreover, we think that the phrase ‘reasons of security’ is 
unnecessarily vague . . . .”). 
 125. See id. 130–31 (“This standard is sufficiently circumspect so as to 
allow the Secret Service, exercising expert judgment which frequently must 
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But what happens in a situation where the government’s 
provided rationale may not be supported by a compelling reason 
or where the government arbitrarily denies the reporter access? 
In other words, what happens if the government’s stated 
rationale is pretextual? The Sherrill court’s procedural 
guidelines allow for the opportunity to rebut the government’s 
decision to deny access: 
We think that notice to the unsuccessful applicant of the 
factual bases for denial with an opportunity to rebut is a 
minimum prerequisite for ensuring that the denial is indeed 
in furtherance of Presidential protection, rather than based 
on arbitrary or less than compelling reasons. The 
requirement of a final statement of denial and the reasons 
therefor is necessary in order to assure that the agency has 
neither taken additional, undisclosed information into 
account, nor responded irrationally to matters put forward 
by way of rebuttal or explanation.126 
Subsequent to Sherrill, three network television 
companies—ABC, NBC, and CBS—alleged that the White 
House Press Office’s decision to exclude their representatives 
“from participating in the press pool coverage of . . . White 
House events, while continuing to allow pool participation by 
representatives of other forms of news media” interfered with 
the First Amendment right of access of the press to cover news 
events and right of the public to receive information about the 
activities and operation of the government.127 After an extensive 
 
be subjective in nature, considerable leeway in denying press passes for 
security reasons.”). 
 126. Id. at 131 (citations omitted).  
 127. Cable News Network, Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 518 F. Supp. 1238, 
1241–42 (N.D. Ga. 1981). The district court provided a definition of a “press 
pool” as: 
The obligation of those in the pool is to share their material with 
those media representatives not included. Traditionally, a very 
small pool, called a “tight pool” has been used when it has been 
deemed necessary to restrict media attendance to no more than 
thirteen persons (which includes one television crew of five persons; 
[for instance,] the television representation in the tight pool has 
been rotated among CBS, ABC, and NBC). Also, a so-called 
“expanded pool” consisting of more than thirteen media 
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review of Supreme Court opinions regarding the press’s right of 
access, in addition to the Sherrill opinion, a Georgia district 
court confirmed “that the First Amendment include[s] a right of 
access to news or information concerning the operations and 
activities of government.”128 This right, however, is “subject to 
limiting considerations such as confidentiality, security, orderly 
process, spatial limitation, and doubtless many others.”129 
The court applied Justice Brennan’s test in Richmond 
Newspapers to decide whether the White House violated the 
station’s rights of access.130  First, the court noted that “there is 
a history of pool coverage of presidential activities going back 
through several past Administrations in which television news 
representatives took part”; in other words, “there is an enduring 
and vital tradition of public entree (through the press as agents) 
to the presidential activities covered by press pool.”131 Second, 
“pool coverage of presidential activities is important to the 
President,” because a “public awareness and understanding of 
the President’s behavior facilitates his effectiveness as 
President,” which is “necessary for a determination by the 
public of the adequacy of the President’s performance.”132 Thus, 
television stations “have a limited right of access to White House 
 
representatives, has been used when some numerical limitation has 
been deemed necessary, but where more than thirteen persons can 
be accommodated. Both the “tight pool” and the “expanded pool” 
include representatives of the print and the television media. 
Id. at 1240–41. 
 128. See, e.g., id. at 1242–44 (reviewing Richmond Newspapers, 
Branzburg, Pell, Saxbe and Sherrill to identify the right of access); Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 
U.S. 665, 684 (1972), Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834–35 (1974), Saxbe v. 
Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 869 (1974), Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124 
(D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 129. Am. Broad. Cos., 518 F. Supp. at 1244. 
 130. See id. (applying the Richmond Newspapers’ two principles that take 
into account “the information sought and the opposing interests invaded” 
(quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 588 (1980))). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
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pool coverage in their capacity as representatives of the public 
and on their own behalf as members of the press.”133 
After the district court found that television stations had a 
limited right of access, it balanced “the interest served by the 
sought-for newsgathering activity against the interest served by 
the governmental restraint.”134 The court recognized the public’s 
interest in having the television stations present in White 
House pool coverage outweighed the interest served by the 
governmental restraint, because as “the importance of the 
particular news event or news setting increases,” “the 
importance of conveying the fullest information possible [also] 
increases,” and here, presidential activities are considered of the 
utmost importance.135 The government failed to present “any 
reason such as considerations of security or space limitation.”136 
Thus, the court held that “the total exclusion of television 
representatives from White House pool coverage denie[d] the 
public and the press their limited right of access, guaranteed by 
the First Amendment.”137  
In Stevens v. New York Racing Association,138 a New York 
district court found that the New York Racing Association 
(NYRA) violated the First Amendment rights of a horse-racing 
newspaper’s publisher when it barred him from taking 
photographs at the NYRA’s racing tracks that were otherwise 
open to the press.139 The court looked at whether the NYRA 
restricted the publisher’s access based upon the content of the 
 
 133. Id. at 1245. 
 134. Id. (citing Borreca v. Fasi, 369 F. Supp. 906 (D. Haw. 1974)). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See Stevens v. N.Y. Racing Ass’n, 665 F. Supp. 164, 175–77 (E.D.N.Y. 
1987) (holding that a nonprofit racing association deprived a publisher of its 
First Amendment rights when it restricted the publisher’s photographer from 
taking photographs in certain areas of the racing track, while other press 
members were allowed access to take photographs). 
 139. See id. at 177 (“[D]efendant is enjoined . . . from prohibiting 
plaintiff . . . from carrying a camera into the paddock 
areas . . . unless . . . plaintiff’s conduct in the paddock area unreasonably 
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publication or whether the restriction “serve[s] a legitimate 
government purpose” and “outweigh[s] the systemic benefits 
inherent in unrestricted (or lesser-restricted) access.”140 The 
court found that the NYRA violated the publisher’s First 
Amendment rights, because the publisher put forth sufficient 
facts to show the NYRA’s restriction was content-based, and in 
fact, likely “pretextual.”141 The rationale behind the 
restriction—that the publication’s “coverage made [the plaintiff] 
appear bigger than the [NYRA]’s events”—is “based on 
disapproval of the contents of [the newspaper].”142 Moreover, the 
fact that the NYRA’s rationale appeared pretextual, due to its 
changing, inconsistent rationales as to why it restricted the 
publisher’s access, bolstered the court’s decision that the 
NYRA’s restriction was content-based.143 But even if the 
restriction was not content-based, the court concluded that the 
publisher had demonstrated sufficient facts that the restriction 
did not “serve a legitimate government objective or that the 
benefits derived from the restriction [were] fewer than the harm 
that it cause[d],” because no one had actually complained about 
the publisher and there was no indication that the publisher’s 
activities “interfered with the normal activities carried on” at 
the racing track.144 In sum, “the costs of the restriction in terms 
of loss of editorial freedom and newsgathering, as well as a 
possible reduction in the readership’s enjoyment, outweigh[ed] 
any benefits which defendant [could have been] expected to 
derive from the restriction.”145 
 
 140. Id. at 175. 
 141. See id. at 175–76 (“The conclusion that defendant’s decision was 
content-based is bolstered by the fact that defendant’s explanation that the 
limitation was imposed because of plaintiff’s conduct appears pretextual.”). 
 142. Id. at 175. 
 143. See id. at 175–76 (explaining how the rationale for restricting the 
plaintiff’s access appeared “pretextual” because of the defendants’ 
“inconsistencies” pre-deposition and post-deposition, revealing that no one had 
actually complained about the plaintiff’s behavior). 
 144. Id. at 176–77. 
 145. Id. at 177. 
 
  
 “OPENING THE DOOR” TO PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCES 867 
 
The D.C. Circuit distinguished its prior Sherrill decision in 
JB Pictures, Inc. v. Department of Defense,146 where media and 
veterans’ organizations challenged a Department of Defense 
policy barring all members of the press and public from access 
to the mortuary of deceased soldiers at a military base.147 The 
D.C. Circuit found that that the Department of Defense’s access 
policy did not violate the plaintiffs’ First Amendment right of 
access because “military bases do not share the tradition of 
openness on which the Court relied in striking down restrictions 
on access to criminal court proceedings,” a reference to the 
Richmond Newspapers/Press-Enterprise “logic and experience” 
test.148 The D.C. Circuit also found that the Department of 
Defense applied its access policy “in a uniform 
fashion . . . regardless of their views on war or the United States 
military.”149 Thus, the access policy did not violate the First 
Amendment’s guarantees of freedom of the press, because the 
base had not “opened the door” to press access.150 
In 2002, the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed Sherrill in Getty 
Images News Service Corp. v. Department of Defense,151 
recognizing that when the Department of Defense (DoD) grants 
 
 146. See JB Pictures, Inc. v. Dep’t of Def., 86 F.3d 236, 242 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(holding that the regulation at issue did not violate the First Amendment 
rights to freedom of speech and the press). 
 147. See id. at 238 (“JB Pictures[,] . . . several other media and veterans’ 
organizations and individual reporters challenged the . . . access policy on 
First Amendment grounds, arguing that precluding access to the war 
dead . . . while permitting access to other activities . . . constituted 
impermissible ‘viewpoint discrimination.’”). 
 148. Id. at 240. 
 149. Id. at 239. 
 150. See id. (noting that merely because the policy allowed the public and 
press “substantial” access to certain areas of the base, and sometimes for 
particular occasions, this did not “open the door” to “complete” access). 
Compare id., with Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833–35 (1974) (finding that 
the prison had not “opened the door” even though it made some areas of the 
prison available to the press and public).  
 151. See Getty Images News Servs. Corp. v. Dept. of Def., 193 F. Supp. 2d 
112, 124 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that the media organization “is likely to 
succeed on the claim that, at some point in time, published criteria and a 
process for obtaining relevant information must be in place to govern media 
access to ongoing detention activities at Guantanamo Bay”). 
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certain media organizations limited access to Guantanamo Bay, 
while restricting others, the First Amendment requires that the 
DoD “must not only have some criteria to guide its 
determinations, but must have a reasonable way of assessing 
whether the criteria are met.”152 Even though the D.C. Circuit 
remained cognizant of the heightened deference associated with 
military affairs, “equal access claims by the press warrant 
careful judicial scrutiny,” regardless of the activity at issue.153 
The government should “publish . . . the criteria used in . . . [its] 
selection process and provide a way for applicant media 
organizations to submit information demonstrating that they 
satisfy the criteria,” an ode to the D.C. Circuit’s imposed 
procedural guidelines in Sherrill.154 This process, in turn, would 
enable the government “to conduct a reasoned evaluation of 
media organizations under clear governing criteria,” which 
would ensure that the government does not arbitrarily deny 
access to the media.155  
A California district court in Telemundo of L.A. v. City of 
L.A.156 considered whether a ceremony commemorating the 
Mexican War of Independence constituted a public or nonpublic 
forum in order to determine the extent to which a television 
broadcast station’s First Amendment rights may be exercised.157 
The court’s consideration of the characterization of the forum is 
 
 152. Friedman, supra note 55, at 283 (quoting Getty Images, 193 F. Supp. 
at 121). 
 153. See Getty Images, 193 F. Supp. at 119 (noting that even though 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base is not a public forum, equal access claims under 
the First Amendment require careful judicial scrutiny). 
 154. Id. at 121 (citing Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 130 (D.C. Cir. 
1977)). 
 155. See id. at 120–21 (expressing concern that the DoD’s method of 
selecting which media organizations are placed on flights to Guantanamo Bay 
arbitrarily or unreasonably denies access to the Naval Station) (citing Sherrill, 
569 F.2d at 130). 
 156. See Telemundo of L.A. v. City of Los Angeles, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 
1103 (C.D. Ca. 2003) (holding that “the City’s restrictions on Telemundo’s 
access to the official ceremony are unreasonable[,]” violating Telemundo’s 
First Amendment rights). 
 157. See id. at 1101 (considering “the character of the location where the 
expressive activity will occur” to begin its First Amendment claim analysis). 
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similar to the “experience” factor in the “logic and experience” 
test—whether there is an “enduring and vital tradition” of 
public access to the forum.”158 The court recognized that 
government property becomes a public forum if the property has 
“traditionally been held in the trust for the use of the public” or 
has been “opened for expressive activity by part or all of the 
public.”159 On the other hand, “nonpublic forums include 
property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for 
public communication.”160 If the property is a public forum, the 
government may impose “time, place, or manner” restrictions, 
provided that “the restrictions are content-neutral” and 
“narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest” 
and “leave open ample alternative channels for communication 
of the information.”161 The court found that a ceremony 
commemorating the Mexican War of Independence constituted 
a public forum, because the ceremony had taken place on 
government property for at least three years, “transforming 
publicly owned property into a public forum for expressive 
activity.”162 Next, the court considered whether the city’s 
restrictions on the station’s broadcast of the ceremony were 
reasonable, in light of the fact that the city granted another 
station access to the ceremony.163 After the station initiated the 
lawsuit, the city argued that the restrictions on the station were 
necessary for public safety reasons.164 The court found that the 
city’s restrictions on the station’s access to the ceremony were 
 
 158. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980) 
(Brennan, J., concurring). 
 159. Telemundo of L.A., 283 F. Supp. 2d at 1101–02. 
 160. Id. at 1102. 
 161. See id. (“If government property has by law or tradition been given 
status as a public forum, a state’s right to limit protected expressive activity 
is sharply circumscribed.”). 
 162. Id. 
 163. See id. at 1102–03 (“[The city] initially decided that KMEX’s cameras 
should be granted access to the official ceremony while Telemundo should be 
required to use a pool feed.”). 
 164. See id. at 1103 (“However, now that the City has made the decision 
[to not grant access to Telemundo], it argues that the restrictions on 
Telemundo are required for public safety reasons pursuant to Los Angeles Fire 
Department Standard Policies and Procedures for outdoor concert events.”). 
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unreasonable, because the city put forth no evidence that it had 
any meaningful or legitimate public safety concerns, such as 
occupancy restrictions, and thus the restrictions appeared 
pretextual.165 Lastly, the court inquired into whether the station 
had shown a reasonable possibility of irreparable injury.166 The 
court rejected the city’s argument that, because the station to 
which the city had granted access would provide a pool feed to 
the plaintiff’s station, it would not be irreparably harmed.167 The 
First Amendment encompasses the right to certain creative, 
discretionary choices, such as deciding “what to film, what to 
emphasize, and what images to relay to viewers.”168 Further, the 
city had not shown that the pooling was in fact necessary.169 
In Raycom National, Inc. v. Campbell,170 an Ohio district 
court found that a mayor had not violated a broadcast station’s 
First Amendment rights when the mayor ordered city officials 
to stop giving the station interviews.171 The court discussed 
what would have had to occur in order for the station’s First 
Amendment rights to have been violated.172 If, for example, a 
broadcast station’s reporters were “prohibited from attending 
press conferences,” or if the government were to bar “access to 
information generally available to other members of the media,” 
 
 165. See id. (“In reviewing the declaration of L.A. Fire Department 
Inspector Benjamin Flores, the Court did not find that he concluded that 
occupancy restrictions preclude Telemundo’s cameras or trucks.”). 
 166. See id. (analyzing the question of irreparable harm in the preliminary 
injunction test after determining that the station had “established a 
substantial likelihood of success on its First Amendment claim”). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See Raycom Nat’l, Inc. v. Campbell, 361 F. Supp. 2d 679, 688 (N.D. 
Ohio 2004) (holding that the station was not entitled to a temporary 
restraining order because it is unlikely to prevail on its claim that the mayor’s 
action violated the station’s First Amendment rights). 
 171. See id. at 681 (explaining that the mayor “issued an ‘edict’ prohibiting 
City officials and employees from speaking with or providing information to 
WOIO reporters” with the exception of answering requests for formal records). 
 172. See id. at 683–84 (noting that what plaintiff was alleging—that the 
station received “interviews or statements off-the-record”—did not amount to 
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then a reporter may have a successful First Amendment 
claim.173 If, on the other hand, a government official merely 
denied exclusive interviews or other special requests that went 
beyond information generally available to other members of the 
media, First Amendment issues would not be triggered.174  
In Nicholas v. City of New York,175 a New York district court 
stated that, when a restriction on the press appears to be 
content-based, it is the proper “subject of additional factual 
development” for a court to inquire into “the motivation 
underlying the limitations on news-gathering . . . especially 
where . . . there are allegations that the reasons provided for the 
restriction are ‘pretextual.’”176 The plaintiff, a photojournalist, 
alleged that his First Amendment rights were violated when the 
New York Police Department (NYPD) revoked his press pass in 
retaliation for the content of his speech.177 He claimed that the 
NYPD discriminated against him based on “his work and the 
NYPD’s prior experiences with him,” when the NYPD 
“knowingly permitted two photojournalists to take pictures of 
the scene from ‘behind police lines,’ while the rest of 
photojournalists were corralled in the ‘press pen,’ out of sight 
and earshot.”178 The court looked at the circumstances 
surrounding Nicholas’s exclusion and the NYPD’s comments 
about Nicholas, and inferred that the NYPD “targeted him 
because they did not believe him to be a ‘team player,’ and they 
had experienced previous run-ins with him.”179 The court 
 
 173. Id. at 683. 
 174. Id. at 684. 
 175. See Nicholas v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-9592, 2017 WL 766905, 
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2017) (holding that the plaintiff’s First Amendment 
allegation, whether characterized as either viewpoint-based discrimination or 
arbitrary, supports a theory of his exclusion from news-gathering). 
 176. Id. at *6 (citing Stevens v. N.Y. Racing Ass’n, 665 F. Supp. 164, 175 
(E.D.N.Y. 1987)). 
 177. See id. at *1 (“Nicholas alleges that Defendants violated his First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights by revoking his New York Police Department 
(“NYPD”) press credential without due process and in retaliation for the 
content of his speech.”). 
 178. Id. at *5–6. 
 179. Id. at *6. 
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accepted Nicholas’s argument that the NYPD arbitrarily denied 
him access: 
[A]rbitrary restrictions on news-gatherers may run afoul of 
the First Amendment, unless Defendants can explain the 
need, because the First Amendment protects the public 
against the government’s arbitrary interference with access 
to important information, including the diversity of media 
outlets covering an event. The nature and potential 
arbitrariness of the limit on some news-gatherers but not 
others is an additional area for more factual development.180 
In 2018, a South Dakota district court in Danielson v. 
Huether,181 like the court in Raycom National, found that the 
plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts to show that city 
government officials violated his First Amendment rights when 
they stopped sending him notifications of press releases and 
press conferences normally sent to the media, denied him access 
to special locations for newsgathering, and stopped answering 
his questions.182 In response to the first two allegations, the 
court found that he had not cited any cases holding that he had 
a right to receive notices of press releases and press conferences, 
nor had he shown “that these special locations were otherwise 
generally available to the media.”183 In regard to the third 
allegation, the court found that “government officials have no 
First Amendment obligations to respond to a particular 
reporter.”184 Although the court did not rule in favor of the 
plaintiff, it suggested what would trigger First Amendment 
issues:  “Of course, denying a member of the press access to 
certain types of information otherwise made available for public 
 
 180. Id. (citations omitted).  
 181. See Danielson v. Huether, No. 4:18-CV-04039, 2018 WL 6681768, at 
*10 (D.S.D. Dec. 19, 2018) (holding that the plaintiff’s “allegations that the 
Defendants failed to treat him like other members of the media are insufficient 
to allege a violation of the First Amendment”). 
 182. See id. at *10. (“Unlike the plaintiffs in Cuomo [or] 
Sherrill, . . . Danielson does not claim that government officials excluded him 
from press conferences or press facilities that were generally open to the public 
or the media.”). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
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dissemination could present potential First Amendment 
problems.”185 
III. Analysis of the Press’s Right of Access 
A. When and On What Grounds Can the President Restrict the 
Press’s Right of Access?:  A Framework 
The aforementioned case law dealing with the press’s right 
of access to government property or certain forums sets forth a 
number of factors to consider in deciding whether the 
government has “opened the door” to press access and on what 
grounds the government can limit that access.186 This case law 
provides workable principles for analyzing whether President 
Trump and his Administration have restrained the press’s right 
of access in violation of the First Amendment. 
Once the President and the Administration have “opened 
the door” to press access generally, they must provide the press 
equal access.187 They can neither exclude a reporter arbitrarily 
or for less than compelling reasons,188 nor exclude based on the 
viewpoint of that reporter or of the affiliated media outlet.189 
 
 185. See id. at *10 (distinguishing from Cuomo and Sherrill, noting that 
plaintiff merely claims “that the City told him that he could no longer receive 
notifications of press releases and conferences normally sent to the 
media . . . and that the City has denied him access to special locations”). 
 186. See Developments in the Law—The Law of Media, supra note 91, at 
1019 (acknowledging that “the media’s right to gather information is far from 
straightforward”). 
 187. See, e.g., Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“[W]e 
are presented with a situation where the White House has voluntarily decided 
to establish press facilities for correspondents who need to report therefrom. 
These press facilities are perceived as being open to all bona fide 
Washington-based journalists . . . .”). 
 188. See, e.g., id. (“White House press facilities having been made publicly 
available as a source of information for newsmen, the protection afforded 
newsgathering under the [F]irst [A]mendment guarantee of freedom of the 
press, requires that this access not be denied arbitrarily or for less than 
compelling reasons.”) (citations omitted). 
 189. See, e.g., id. at 129 (“[A]rbitrary or content-based criteria for press 
pass issuance are prohibited under the [F]irst [A]mendment . . . .”). 
 
  
874 26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 837 (2020) 
 
In order to determine whether the Administration has 
“opened the door” of the forum to press access, both the 
Richmond Newspapers’ two-part “logic and experience” test190 
and Cuomo’s equal access test191 provide guidance. Where there 
is a history of press access, access should generally not be 
denied.192 This general rule, however, does not preclude the 
President from granting an individual interview with a specific 
reporter without being required to grant individual interviews 
with other reporters.193 
Once a court has determined the Administration has 
“opened the door” to the press generally, it should then inquire 
whether the government has denied particular reporters access 
arbitrarily, for less than compelling reasons, or based on the 
viewpoint of that reporter or of the affiliated media outlet. The 
court is to engage in careful judicial scrutiny in considering the 
press access issue.194 Such careful judicial scrutiny requires the 
Administration to put forth compelling reasons for restricting 
members of the press that do not include discriminatory or 
 
 190. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (asking first, whether there is an “enduring and vital 
tradition” of public access to the forum, and second, “whether access to a 
particular government process is important in terms of that very process”); see 
also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986) (referring to the 
Richmond Newspapers test as “tests of experience and logic”); Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) (“[T]he institutional 
value of the open criminal trial is recognized in both logic and experience.”). 
 191. See Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Cuomo, 570 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(“[O]nce there is a public function, public comment, and participation by some 
of the media, the First Amendment requires equal access to all of the media 
or the rights of the First Amendment would no longer be tenable.”). 
 192. Id. 
 193. See, e.g., Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“Nor 
is the discretion of the President to grant interviews or briefings with selected 
journalists challenged. It would certainly be unreasonable to suggest that 
because the President allows interviews with some bona fide journalists, he 
must give this opportunity to all.”). 
 194. See, e.g., Getty Images News Servs. Corp. v. Dep’t of Def., 193 F. Supp. 
2d 112, 119 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“[E]qual access claims by the press warrant 
careful judicial scrutiny.”); Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 130 (noting that the 
government must provide “meaningful” rationales to allow for “meaningful 
judicial review of decisions to deny press passes”). 
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arbitrary exclusions or pretextual rationales.195 Further, even 
when an Administration invokes a concern related to the special 
nature of the presidency and the White House, like 
“confidentiality, security, orderly process, [or] spatial 
limitation,”196 as the reason for restricting press access, the 
court should still ask whether the restriction serves a 
compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to 
serve the Administration’s interest.197 Thus, the court should be 
able to inquire into an Administration’s motive to determine if 
the Administration has a legitimate purpose for restricting the 
press’s access.198 
 
 195. See, e.g., Nicholas v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-9592, 2017 WL 
766905, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2017) (“[T]he motivation underlying the 
limitations on news-gathering is properly the subject of additional factual 
development, especially where, as here, there are allegations that the reasons 
provided for the restriction are pretextual.”); Stevens v. N.Y. Racing Ass’n, 665 
F. Supp. 164, 175–76 E.D.N.Y. 1987) (“The conclusion that defendant’s 
decision was content-based is bolstered by the fact that defendant’s 
explanation that the limitation was imposed because of plaintiff’s conduct 
appears pretextual.”). 
 196. Cable News Network, Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 518 F. Supp. 1238, 1244 
(N.D. Ga. 1981). 
 197. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982) 
(recognizing that the government can only overcome the right of access to 
criminal trials if it can show “that the denial is necessitated by a compelling 
governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”). 
 198. See, e.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53–54 (1982) (“[T]he First 
Amendment surely requires that the restriction be demonstrably supported by 
not only a legitimate state interest, but a compelling one, and that the 
restriction operate without unnecessarily circumscribing protected 
expression.”); Stevens v. N.Y. Racing Ass’n, 665 F. Supp. 164, 175 (E.D.N.Y. 
1987) (explaining that a limitation on the press, even if not content-based, 
must “serve a legitimate governmental purpose, must be rationally related to 
the accomplishment of that purpose, and must outweigh the systemic benefits 
inherent in unrestricted (or lesser-restricted) access”); see also Developments 
in the Law—The Law of Media, supra note 91, at 1029–31 (suggesting a 
motive-based inquiry focusing on “why, not whether, the doors have been shut 
on particular reporter,” which “would likely eliminate the most obvious and 
egregious forms of viewpoint discrimination,” while also allowing government 
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B. Applying the Framework to the Three Trump-Press Incidents 
The outset of this Note summarized three incidents in 
which President Trump and his Administration excluded 
members of the press, arguably in violation of the First 
Amendment.199 This section will apply the framework for 
analyzing the press’s right of access suggested above to those 
three incidents.200 
1. Incident #1:  The Gaggle Exclusion 
The first incident involved the White House’s exclusion of 
certain news organizations from an off-camera gaggle with the 
Press Secretary while allowing others to attend, hours after 
President Trump had denounced the press as “the enemy of the 
American People” due to his frustration with a New York Times 
article detailing contacts between Trump and Russian 
intelligence officials.201 The White House had pre-determined 
the media outlets that would be allowed into the gaggle, which 
many characterized as a notable break from protocol in the 
White House.202 
The first question is whether the White House “opened the 
door” to press access. White House press conferences in general 
have been a “regular, if not always successful, feature of 
presidential–press relationships” since President Woodrow 
Wilson’s Administration, a mark of a long history and an 
enduring tradition.203 Further, press conferences in the White 
House play an important role in establishing a forum for the 
press that in turn provides a connection between daily White 
House activities and the general public, who lack hard passes. 
Thus, as to press conferences, the two-prong “experience and 
 
 199. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 200. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 201. See discussion supra Part I.A.1. 
 202. See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text. 
 203. See Martha Joynt Kumar, Source Material:  Presidential Press 
Conferences:  The Importance and Evolution of an Enduring Forum, 35 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 166, 168 (2005) (“The development of this forum came 
about through the efforts of the president and his staff, but the commitment 
to such sessions is testimony to the press’s continuing interest in the 
presidency no matter who serves as president or what he says or does.”).  
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logic” analysis in Richmond Newspapers would support a First 
Amendment right of access the White House must recognize. 
But does access to press pools or gaggles enjoy the same 
right of access? White House press pass holders historically 
have enjoyed access to gaggles. Moreover, press access to 
gaggles play a particularly significant role, taking the place of 
typical daily press conferences. 
The second question is whether the government has denied 
a reporter arbitrarily, for less than compelling reasons, or based 
on the viewpoint of the reporter or of the affiliated media outlet. 
The White House’s motivation to exclude specific media outlets 
arguably was not compelling because the White House did not 
justify its action with logistical concerns, such as spatial 
constraints.204 The exclusion may also have been arbitrary 
because the Press Secretary’s explanation did not include any 
meaningful reason for the exclusion:205  “We had a pool and then 
we expanded it. We added some folks to come cover it. We do 
what we can to be accessible . . . . I think we have gone above 
and beyond when it comes to accessibility and openness . . . .”206 
Further, an argument can be made from the timing that the 
decision to exclude specific media outlets was motivated by the 
viewpoints of those particular outlets. The exclusion of outlets, 
including that of the New York Times, occurred within a few 
hours of Trump denouncing the press “as the enemy of the 
American people” in reaction to the Times article.207 To 
overcome the government’s heavy burden in First Amendment 
cases, the White House would have had to put forth a legitimate, 
compelling interest for excluding the media outlets from the 
gaggle.208 It did not appear to do so. 
 
 204. See Cable News Network, Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 518 F. Supp. 1238, 
1244 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (specifying “confidentiality, security, orderly process, [or] 
spatial limitation” as possible compelling concerns). 
 205. See cases cited supra note 194. 
 206. Vitali, supra note 1. 
 207. Vitali, supra note 6. 
 208. See cases cited supra notes 197–198. 
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2. Incident #2:  The Press Conference Exclusion 
The second incident involved the White House banning a 
CNN reporter from attending an open press event with 
President Trump after she asked him questions about his 
former lawyer Michael Cohen and Russian president Vladmir 
Putin at an earlier photo op at the White House.209 
The first question—whether the Administration has 
“opened the door” to the press generally—is easily satisfied here 
because the event in the Rose Garden was characterized as 
open.210 The second question—whether the Administration 
denied a reporter arbitrarily, for less than compelling reasons, 
or based on the viewpoint of that reporter or of the affiliated 
media outlet—requires looking at the Administration’s 
rationale for excluding the reporter.211 After the incident, Press 
Secretary Sarah Sanders said that the reporter had “shouted 
questions and refused to leave despite repeatedly being asked to 
do so . . . . [We] made clear that any other journalist from her 
network could attend.”212 Unless the reporter was acting out in 
a way that triggered legitimate concerns regarding security or 
other published guidelines restricting the type of questioning in 
which the reporter engaged, the White House may have 
excluded the reporter arbitrarily or for less than compelling 
reasons. More likely, the White House excluded the reporter 
based on the content of the reporter’s questions given the close 
temporal connection between the reporter’s questions about 
touchy news stories involving the President’s professional 
relationships and the subsequent exclusion. 
3. Incident #3:  The Press Pass Suspension 
The third incident involved the suspension of CNN reporter 
Jim Acosta’s press pass because of an alleged, and later 
discredited, altercation between Acosta and a White House 
 
 209. See discussion supra Part I.A.2. 
 210. See discussion supra Part I.A.2. 
 211. See cases cited supra note 194. 
 212. McLausand, supra note 12. 
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intern.213 After the incident, Press Secretary Sanders issued a 
statement that indicated a shift from the White House’s original 
rationale for suspending Acosta’s license—that Acosta placed 
his hands on the White House intern—to the rationale that the 
White House must “run an orderly and fair press conference” 
and cannot allow a member of the press “to monopolize the 
floor.”214 A district court judge later granted CNN”s temporary 
restraining order and ordered the Administration to reinstate 
Acosta’s hard pass, but did not base the decision on First 
Amendment grounds.215 
The first question—whether the Administration had 
“opened the door” to the press—is satisfied here because the 
press conference took place in the long-established White House 
Press Room. Cuomo’s equal access test to determine whether 
the government has “opened the door” provides guidance:  
“[O]nce there is a public function, public comment, and 
participation by some of the media, the First Amendment 
requires equal access to all of the media or the rights of the First 
Amendment would no longer be tenable.”216 First, the White 
House press facilities provide a “public function,” because they 
allow members of the press from a variety of media outlets 
access to White House press conferences, which in turn allows 
those media outlets to provide a buffet of perspectives to the 
interested public. Second, without this access, “public 
comment”—whether interpreted as the press’s ability to 
comment on and critique the government, or the public’s ability 
to make well-informed opinions after the press has provided it 
with information concerning the operations and activities of 
government—would be impossible. Third, the fact that 
Washington-based reporters and White House correspondents 
have hard passes, as Acosta has, to have more-or-less 
unrestricted, albeit regulated, access to White House press 
conferences establishes “participation by some of the media.” 
 
 213. See discussion supra Part I.A.3. 
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Under the second part of the analysis, there are two 
perspectives as to whether the White House revoked Acosta’s 
hard pass arbitrarily, for less than compelling reasons, or based 
upon his viewpoint. On one hand, the White House may have 
arbitrarily excluded Acosta because the alleged physical 
altercation between Acosta and the White House intern was 
later disproven.217 Thus, it follows that the Press Secretary’s 
statement after the revocation of Acosta’s hard pass indicating 
that the “White House cannot run an orderly and fair press 
conference when a reporter acts this way, which is neither 
appropriate nor professional,” is unsupported.218 On the other 
hand, the White House may have excluded Acosta based on its 
opinion of CNN because during the incident in the press 
conference, President Trump said, “When you report fake news, 
which CNN does, a lot, you are the enemy of the people.”219 
Moreover, the White House may have excluded Acosta based on 
the content of Acosta’s questions due to the almost immediate 
temporal connection between Acosta’s questions about touchy 
subjects and Trump’s request to have the microphone taken 
away from Acosta.220 In any case, the White House’s shifting, 
inconsistent rationales point to the likelihood that the exclusion 
was pretextual, a factor present in the 2017 case Nicholas.221 
IV. Conclusion 
This Note proposes a framework for courts to apply in 
future right of access cases where the President and his or her 
Administration exclude or restrict the access of specific 
reporters to press-briefing events. In light of the three events 
involving the Trump Administration described in this Note, one 
of which resulted in a lawsuit, it is not impracticable to expect 
forthcoming similar incidents as well. In the first few months of 
2019, President Trump tweeted that “THE RIGGED AND 
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 221. See supra text accompanying note 176. 
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CORRUPT MEDIA IS THE ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE!”;222 
that the New York Times is “a true ENEMY OF THE 
PEOPLE!”;223 and the Washington Post is “Fake News” after 
these newspapers published news stories that he did not like.224 
These remarks would provide support for a reporter’s claim that 
the President has violated the reporter’s First Amendment right 
of access because his comments are consistent with an 
unconstitutional motive to exclude “unfriendly” members of the 
press.225 
The White House has “opened the door” to the press because 
there is an enduring tradition of press members being granted 
passes to the White House to gain access to daily press 
conferences, whether planned or impromptu. This established 
access is invaluable as it is through the press that the general 
public becomes informed on the actions and policies of the 
current Administration. The case law discussed in this Note 
indicates that the White House must possess a compelling 
government interest for press access limitations that is 
legitimate and viewpoint neutral, and that the limitations must 
be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Anything less is an 
impermissible “closing” of the door and frustration of the 
political values the First Amendment is designed to protect. 
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